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ABSTRACT
Background Problems of quality and safety
persist in health systems worldwide. We
conducted a large research programme to
examine culture and behaviour in the English
National Health Service (NHS).
Methods Mixed-methods study involving
collection and triangulation of data from multiple
sources, including interviews, surveys,
ethnographic case studies, board minutes and
publicly available datasets. We narratively
synthesised data across the studies to produce a
holistic picture and in this paper present a high-
level summary.
Results We found an almost universal desire to
provide the best quality of care. We identified
many ‘bright spots’ of excellent caring and
practice and high-quality innovation across the
NHS, but also considerable inconsistency.
Consistent achievement of high-quality care was
challenged by unclear goals, overlapping
priorities that distracted attention, and
compliance-oriented bureaucratised
management. The institutional and regulatory
environment was populated by multiple external
bodies serving different but overlapping
functions. Some organisations found it difficult
to obtain valid insights into the quality of the
care they provided. Poor organisational and
information systems sometimes left staff
struggling to deliver care effectively and
disempowered them from initiating
improvement. Good staff support and
management were also highly variable, though
they were fundamental to culture and were
directly related to patient experience, safety and
quality of care.
Conclusions Our results highlight the
importance of clear, challenging goals for
high-quality care. Organisations need to put the
patient at the centre of all they do, get smart
intelligence, focus on improving organisational
systems, and nurture caring cultures by ensuring
that staff feel valued, respected, engaged and
supported.
INTRODUCTION
A commitment to delivering high-quality,
safe healthcare has been a policy goal of
governments worldwide for more than a
decade, but progress in delivering on
these aspirations has been modest:1
patients everywhere continue to suffer
avoidable harm and substandard care.2 3
England’s National Health Service (NHS)
has not been immune to these problems.
Despite some encouraging evidence of
improvement in quality and safety,4 5
large and inexplicable variations in
quality of care are evident across multiple
domains and sectors of healthcare, from
primary through to community and sec-
ondary care.6 7 England has also seen a
number of high-profile scandals involving
egregious failings in the quality and
safety of individual providers. These
include the case of Mid Staffordshire
NHS Foundation Trust,8 the subject of a
recently published public inquiry by Sir
Robert Francis into how catastrophic fail-
ings in the quality and safety of care went
undetected and uncorrected.9
Francis identified the causes of organ-
isational degradation at Mid Staffordshire
as systemic; he saw the underlying faults
as institutional and cultural in character.
He found significant weaknesses in NHS
systems for oversight, accountability and
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influence for patient safety and quality of care.
Central to his analysis was evidence of a large-scale
failure of control and leadership at multiple levels,
from what social scientists term the ‘blunt end’ of the
system where decisions, policies, rules, regulations,
resources and incentives are generated,10 through to
the ‘sharp end’, often known as the ‘frontline’, where
care is provided to patients. The distinction between
the blunt end and the sharp end is of course a heuris-
tic one; many within healthcare organisations function
in hybrid positions as managers and practitioners.
Nonetheless, it is useful to recognise how the blunt
end, by shaping the environment where care is deliv-
ered, may create the ‘latent conditions’11 that increase
the risks of failure at the sharp end, but may equally
generate organisational contexts that are conducive to
providing high-quality care. Such contexts include
culture: Francis blamed an ‘insidious negative culture
involving a tolerance of poor standards and a disen-
gagement from managerial and leadership responsibil-
ities’.8 Culture is, of course, a term that is widely used
but notoriously escapes consensual definition.12 Many
definitions of culture (including Schein’s13 influential
approach) nonetheless have in common an emphasis
on the shared basic assumptions, norms, and values
and repeated behaviours of particular groups into
which new members are socialised, to the extent that
culture becomes ‘the way things are done around
here’.
The findings of the Francis inquiry are depressingly
familiar. England is not alone in experiencing organ-
isational crises in healthcare; examples of failures in
healthcare systems have occurred as far apart as New
Zealand, the USA and the Netherlands. Several dem-
onstrate precisely the same features as Mid
Staffordshire, including long incubation periods
during which warning signs were discounted, poor
management systems, failure to respond to patient
concerns, cultures of secrecy and protectionism, frag-
mentation of knowledge about problems and responsi-
bility for addressing them, and cultures of denial of
uncomfortable information.14 An important question
thus concerns the extent to which the features of the
Mid Staffordshire case might be symptoms of more
widespread pathologies, given that other organisations
in the NHS are exposed to the same institutional and
regulatory environment. In this article, we offer
lessons from a large multimethod research programme
on culture and behaviour related to quality and safety
in the NHS.
The research programme covered a critical period
between 2010, following the initial inquiry into Mid
Staffordshire15 and the White Paper on the NHS,16
and 2012, when the Health and Social Care Act was
passed. The programme involved a large number of
substudies using different methods to seek evidence
from staff and patients throughout the English NHS,
from large subsamples of NHS organisations, strategic
level stakeholders, teams, and patient and carer orga-
nisations, and from detailed case studies. It was thus
able to provide graduated levels of focus and multiple
lenses. Each of the individual substudies will be
reported separately, but there is considerable value in
bringing the learning from them together holistically.
In this article, we provide a synthesis across the
studies to draw out high-level learning about culture
and behaviour in NHS organisations; what influences
culture and behaviour; and what needs to change to
give effect to the vision of a safe, compassionate
service in which patients and their families could have
trust and confidence.
METHODS
We conducted a large, mixed-method research pro-
gramme involving seven separate substudies (table 1).
The programme received ethical approval from an
NHS Research Ethics Committee. In summary,
primary data were drawn from:
▸ 107 interviews with key, senior level stakeholders from
across the NHS and beyond;
▸ 197 interviews from the ‘blunt end’ (executive and
board level) of NHS primary care and acute organisa-
tions through to the ‘sharp end’ (frontline clinicians)
where staff care for patients;
▸ over 650 h of ethnographic observation in hospital
wards, primary care practices, and accident and emer-
gency units;
▸ 715 survey responses from patient and carer
organisations;
▸ two focus groups and 10 interviews with patient and
carer organisations;
▸ team process and performance data from 621 clinical
teams, drawn from the acute, ambulance, mental health,
primary care and community trust sectors;
▸ 793 sets of minutes from the meetings of 71 NHS trust
boards from multiple sectors over an 18-month period,
including detailed analysis of eight boards’ minutes.
We did not use a formal protocol for integrating the
findings across these studies,17 instead deploying a
more interpretive, narrative approach.18 We engaged
in extensive discussions as a team, and identified
points of convergence and updated our analytic cat-
egories as we came closer to agreement. Given the
size of our datasets, we are able to provide only very
limited primary data in support of our analysis in this
article; our focus is on high-level messages. Further
details of the methods and the data are available in a
longer report.19
RESULTS
Our synthesis of the findings across the substudies
allowed many insights into the challenges of realising
a vision of reliably safe, high-quality care across the
NHS, and important learning about how improve-
ment can best be secured.
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Table 1 Summary of elements of the research programme
Study element Participants and scheduling Setting Focus of research Analytic approach
1. Stakeholder
interviews
107 semi-structured telephone
interviews with those closely
involved in quality and safety
Acute trusts, ambulance trusts, mental health
trusts, community trusts, foundation trusts,
primary care trusts, strategic health authorities,
general practices and healthcare commissioning
organisations
Understanding of vision of high-quality and safe care;
what is required to make it happen; theories of
change; plans to implement quality and safety
improvement, enhance leadership and promote staff
engagement; views on what quality improvement
means, how it could best be secured, and obstacles
Analysis based on constant comparative method
Use of QSR NVivo 8 software
2. Ethnographic case
studies: observations
and interviews
Comparative case studies across
seven purposively chosen cases
650 h of observation; 197
semi-structured interviews with
executive and board-level staff
and frontline staff
Four hospital trusts; a quality improvement
collaborative; a large-scale quality improvement
programme involving dozens of organisations;
one primary care provider involving a chain of
practices
Assessing culture and behaviour in relation to quality,
staff engagement with quality, leadership for quality,
quality improvement, practical actions for promoting
cultures of high-quality care
Analysis based on constant comparative method
Coding within and across cases, systematically
searching for where clusters of codes formed a
pattern
Combining data from interviews across cases and
stakeholders to form a single dataset
3a. Patient and public
involvement: survey
715 survey responses
Cross-sectional
Patient participation groups The survey consisted of 14 statements about patient
experience. Open text box provided for each
statement
Quantitative analysis—largely descriptive
Open-ended responses subject to content analysis to
derive themes inductively
3b. Patient and public
involvement: focus
groups and interviews
Two focus groups and 10
interviews
Patient and carer organisations Interpret the findings of the survey
Assessing views on obstacles to delivering improved
quality and safety and greater accountability in the
NHS
Qualitative analysis of key themes
4a. NHS staff and
patient surveys: patient
satisfaction survey data
165 acute trusts—data from
2007, 2009, 2011
Acute trusts Patient satisfaction came from the National Acute
Inpatient Survey, using the data on patients’ overall
ratings of care
Descriptive statistics and paired sample t tests
4b. NHS staff and
patient surveys:
national staff survey
data
309 NHS trusts from 2007,
2009, 2011 national staff
survey
Primary care, ambulance, acute care and mental
health trusts
Staff engagement, organisational climate, job
satisfaction, manager support, job design, errors and
reporting, work pressure, bullying, harassment and
abuse, team working, training, appraisal, stress
Descriptive statistics and paired sample t tests
4c. NHS staff and
patient surveys:
outcome measures
2005–2009 Primary care, ambulance, acute care and mental
health trusts
Patient mortality (acute sector only) (hospital
standardised mortality ratio); quality of services and
use of resources (Annual Health Check ratings by
Healthcare Commission between 2005/2006 and
2008/2009); infection rates (MRSA) per 10000 bed
days; staff absenteeism; staff turnover
Detailed correlation analysis between staff survey and
inpatient survey; multiple and multilevel regression
analysis, using HR practice variables to predict
engagement; regression and ordinal logistic
regression analysis to predict patient satisfaction,
patient mortality, staff absenteeism, staff turnover,
infection rates, and Annual Health Check ratings,
controlling for trust type, size and location; latent
growth curve modelling to predict outcomes
5. Clinical teams
functioning,
effectiveness and
innovation
621 teams (4604 responses)
Aston Team Performance
Inventory
Cross-sectional data with data
on team changes collected from
388 teams (1299 individuals)
3 months later
51 trusts (13 acute, 17 mental health, 10
ambulance and 11 primary care trusts)
Team functioning:
task design, team effort and skills, organisational
support, resources, objectives, participation, creativity,
conflict, reflexivity, task focus, leadership, satisfaction,
attachment, effectiveness, inter-team relationships,
innovation
Leaders’/external raters’ evaluations of effectiveness
Descriptive analysis, ANOVA, regression and relative
importance analysis
Analysis and ratings from domain relevant experts
Open-ended responses subject to content analysis to
derive the themes
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Goal setting
Virtually all those we interviewed (over 300 in total)
were firmly committed to the ideal of a safe, high-
quality health service for patients and to good patient
experience. Many identified the values of compassion
and care as at the heart of the mission for their orga-
nisations, and as their most deeply felt personal pro-
fessional commitment. Our interviews, observations,
surveys and documentary analysis were united in sug-
gesting that, for organisations to succeed in delivering
high-quality, safe care, they needed to have a clearly
articulated vision, including explicit goals for quality
and safety and a strategy for achieving them.
Interviews and observations repeatedly emphasised
the importance of clear goals in establishing and sign-
posting priorities for improvement, motivating staff
and ensuring resources were appropriately directed.
Our survey evidence from the national patient satisfac-
tion and national staff surveys (NSS) showed that
patient satisfaction was highest in trusts that had clear
goals at every level. Consistent with the findings of
the Francis inquiry, boards of organisations were iden-
tified in interviews as particularly influential in setting
the overall direction and demonstrating the commit-
ment and organisational priority given to quality and
safety.
But converting laudable aspirations for high-quality,
safe and compassionate care into clear goals appeared
challenging. Clarity about goals, how they could be
achieved, and leadership for delivery were highly vari-
able. Our questionnaire surveys of board members
showed that they rarely stated clear board objectives
that were challenging and measurable. The 621 front-
line clinical teams we studied were generally even less
clear about their objectives.
A major challenge in creating unifying visions for
patient safety and quality and setting clear objectives
was the range, diversity and complexity of external
expectations and requirements that NHS organisations
faced. Board and executive teams described an institu-
tional and regulatory environment that was populated
by external agencies and actors who served different
but overlapping functions. They reported that targets,
standards, incentives and measures seemed to crowd
in from multiple external sources; that the same infor-
mation was required many times in different formats;
and that answering to so many masters and producing
data for so many external audiences was costly and
distracting. The proliferation of externally set prior-
ities and the number of different agencies and actors
created what we termed ‘priority thickets’—dense
patches of overlapping or disjointed goals that com-
manded very substantial attention and resources, but
did not necessarily provide clear direction or facilitate
the development of clear goals, internally coherent
visions or strategies linked to local priorities.
Faced with so many competing demands, some
organisations tended to revert to a highlyTa
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bureaucratised form of management, characterised by
proliferation of rules, procedures and forms corre-
sponding to externally imposed demands. Many of
these seemed to be motivated mostly by a need to
make displays of compliance,20 rather than by genuine
efforts to make systems safer or of better quality.
Much of this activity could be characterised as defen-
sive and reactive. It was a source of frustration
throughout organisations; frontline teams complained
of ‘blanket’ policies which were seen as ‘very prescrip-
tive and not concentrated on clinical work’.
We also found considerable variability in how far
organisations succeed in making their aspirations for
high-quality care real: what we termed ‘bright spots’
and ‘dark spots’ were both evident, even within the
same organisations. Bright spots included teams and
individuals who demonstrated caring, compassion,
cooperation and civility, and a commitment to learn-
ing and innovation. Direct observations found that in
many settings patients were often treated with kind-
ness and respect, systems functioned well, and staff
were busy but knew what they were doing and why.
Compliance with many standards of good practice,
such as hygiene and equipment counting, was
observed to be very good in many cases.
Though much care was of such high quality as to be
inspiring, substandard care or ‘dark spots’ were also
evident. Dark spots were found where staff were chal-
lenged to provide quality care, were harried or dis-
tracted, or were preoccupied with bureaucracy. Across
our interviews, surveys and observations we found
evidence of staff and patient concern about variability
in quality of care, and a lack of confidence that care
would be reliably good. Interviews and surveys with
patient and carer groups suggested that patients and
their carers were often concerned about quality and
safety. Vulnerable patients, including older patients,
young patients or those who lacked the ability to
‘speak up’, were reported to be at risk of being left to
‘fend for themselves’ or ‘being forgotten’. Our obser-
vations in clinical areas and our interviews confirmed
that inconsistency was a feature of many settings. For
example, many staff spoke to patients politely and
with kindness, but some others were brusque, impa-
tient or discourteous. Some senior clinical nursing
staff highlighted their concern at what they saw as a
tendency towards task-focused rather than person-
centred care.
Further evidence of the challenges of realising a vision
of consistently high-quality safe care came from our
analysis of the NHS Staff Survey and inpatient survey
data over the period 2007–2011 (tables 2 and 3). This
suggested that there had been improvements in scores
relating to quality and safety reported by patients and
staff nationally between 2007 and 2009, but subse-
quently these improvements stalled or went into
reverse. Some of the plateauing may reflect a natural
maximum level being reached. For example, the per-
centage of staff receiving health and safety training
increased from 2007 to 2009, and appears to remain
relatively constant in 2011. Likewise, levels of job satis-
faction increased from 2007 to a moderately high level
in 2009, and then stayed approximately the same in
2011. However, measures on the staff survey relating
to error and incident reporting, blame cultures and
improvements following incidents, where there was
headroom for improvement, appeared to have shown
only very modest gains. The number of staff working
paid extra hours has decreased consistently, but since
2009 the number working unpaid extra hours has
increased sharply. The percentage of staff receiving
training in infection control related issues increased
from 2007 to 2009, but fell in 2011.
Variability in intelligence
A major challenge to achieving goals relating to
quality and safety was that of ensuring that high-
quality intelligence was available to organisations,
teams, and individuals about how well they were
doing and where the deficits and risks in organisa-
tional systems lay. NHS organisations that we studied
were putting considerable time, effort and resources
into data collection and monitoring systems. They typ-
ically used a combination of routinely collected data,
specific data collection initiatives, and sporadic
sources such as spot checks and audits. To a varying
extent they also drew on feedback provided by clinical
staff and patients as a means of assessing trends.
However, the degree to which data collection efforts
translated into actionable knowledge, and then into
Table 2 Changes in the National Staff Survey 2007–2011 (NHS trusts in England)
2007 2009 2011
Change
2007–2009
Change
2009–2011
Standard
deviation (2007)
‘I have adequate materials, supplies and equipment to do my work’ 3.22 3.36 3.38 +0.14** +0.02* 0.18
’There are enough staff at this Trust for me to do my job properly’ 2.61 2.78 2.72 +0.17** −0.06** 0.17
‘I do not have time to carry out all my work’ 3.30 3.26 3.25 −0.04** −0.01 0.21
Results are based on the 309 NHS trusts in England with data from all 3 years shown. p values are based on paired sample t tests. Responses were on a
1–5 scale with 5 indicating greater agreement with statements; an increase of 0.10 is equivalent to 10% of respondents moving up one category of
response, for example, from ‘neither agree nor disagree’ to ‘agree’.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01.
NHS, National Health Service.
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effective organisational responses, differed markedly
between organisations.
Some behaviours in relation to data gathering might
be described as ‘problem-sensing’; other, less positive
behaviours were ‘comfort-seeking’. Problem-sensing
involved actively seeking out weaknesses in organisa-
tional systems, and it made use of multiple sources of
data—not just mandated measures, but also softer
intelligence. Soft intelligence could be gathered in
many ways, including active listening to patients and
staff; informal, unannounced visits to clinical areas;
and techniques such as ‘mystery shoppers’, shadowing
of staff, and swapping roles for a short period. While
sometimes discomfiting, this less routinely gathered
knowledge enabled fresh, more penetrating insights to
complement quantitative data. Senior teams displaying
problem-sensing behaviours tended to be cautious
about being self-congratulatory; perhaps more import-
antly, when they did uncover problems, they often
used strategies that went beyond merely sanctioning
staff at the sharp end, making more holistic efforts to
strengthen their organisations and teams.
Comfort-seeking behaviours are defined here as
being focused on external impression management
and seeking reassurance that all was well; conse-
quently, what was available to organisations was data,
but not intelligence. Serious blind spots could arise
when organisations used a very limited range of
methods for gathering data, were preoccupied with
demonstrating compliance with external expectations,
failed to listen to negative signals from staff or lacked
knowledge of the real issues at the frontline. Comfort-
seeking tended to demonstrate preoccupation with
positive news and results from staff, and could lead to
concerns and critical comments being dismissed as
‘whining’ or disruptive behaviour. When comfort-
seeking was the predominant behaviour, data
collection activities were prone to being treated by
sharp-end staff as wearisome and fruitless accountabil-
ity exercises. Some staff reported that they felt the
main purpose of much data collection was to allow
individuals to be blamed if something did go wrong,
not to make the system safer.
Variability in systems
Interviews, observations and surveys showed that
when staff had access to appropriate resources, per-
ceived that staffing levels were adequate with the right
skill mix, and had systems that functioned effectively,
they felt that they could complete their work success-
fully, could explore new ways of improving quality
and could develop reflective practices. This reinforced
their levels of motivation and morale in a virtuous
circle. But deficits in systems often obstructed and fru-
strated well-motivated staff in their mission to provide
good care for patients. Our analysis of questionnaire
reports from 621 clinical teams showed that many
staff felt unable to achieve their goals for patients
because of organisational factors outside their control.
Observations showed that staff wasted time working
with poorly designed IT systems, negotiating clinical
pathways with obstructions and gaps, and battling
with multiple professional groups and subsystems (e.g.
pharmacy, microbiology and imaging, and many
others) that did not operate in integrated ways. We
also found evidence of problematic handovers
between shifts, departments and teams, team conflict
and a diffusion of responsibility relating to particular
patients. Patient and carer groups reported discontinu-
ities in care between institutional boundaries and even
within single organisations. These ‘responsibility
cordons’ left patients variously ill informed, distressed
and disappointed, and sometimes in danger.
Table 3 Changes in the National Staff Survey and Acute Inpatient Survey 2007–2011 (NHS trusts in England)
2007 2009 2011
Change
2007–2009
Change
2009–2011
Standard
deviation (2007)
Staff survey
‘My trust encourages us to report errors, near misses or incidents’ 3.84 3.93 3.94 +0.09** +0.01* 0.11
‘My trust treats reports of errors, near misses or incidents confidentially’ 3.55 3.63 3.66 +0.08** +0.03** 0.10
‘My trust blames or punishes people who are involved in errors, near
misses or incidents’
2.75 2.67 2.68 −0.08** +0.01 0.12
‘When errors, near misses or incidents are reported, my trust takes action
to ensure that they do not happen again’
3.47 3.54 3.57 +0.07** +0.03** 0.13
Acute inpatient survey
In your opinion, how clean was the hospital room or ward that
you were in?
3.45 3.60 3.63 +0.15** +0.03** 0.13
As far as you know, did doctors wash or clean their hands between
touching patients? (% of positive responses)
53 59 57 +6** −2* 6
Staff survey results are based on the 309 NHS trusts in England with data from all 3 years shown. p values are based on paired sample t tests. Staff survey
responses were on a 1–5 scale with 5 indicating greater agreement with statements; an increase of 0.10 is equivalent to 10% of respondents moving up
one category of response, for example, from ‘neither agree nor disagree’ to ‘agree’. Inpatient survey results are based on the 157 NHS acute trusts in
England with data from all 3 years shown. Inpatient survey responses were on a 1–4 scale, with 4 indicating greater agreement with statements.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01.
NHS, National Health Service.
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Staff at the sharp end were very often aware of
systems problems but felt powerless to bring about
change. Changes within organisations, uncertainty
about priorities, poor systems, heavy workloads and
staff shortages were all blamed for staff feeling they
lacked support, further reducing their motivation and
morale. Given that many systems required significant
improvement, it was disappointing that we found a
clear trend of decreasing levels of board innovation,
especially in relation to quality and safety.
We defined innovation as the intentional introduc-
tion of processes and procedures, new to the unit of
adoption (team or organisation) and designed to sig-
nificantly benefit the unit of adoption, staff, patients or
the wider public. An analysis of board minutes from 71
NHS Trusts covering an 18-month period between
January 2010 and June 2011 identified a total of 144
innovations that were implemented in organisations,
representing an average of only 1–3 per organisation.
More than half were focused on increasing productiv-
ity (73), with very few related to safety (14). The
largest number of innovations (62) was identified
between January and June 2010, followed by 56 inno-
vations between July and December 2010. Only 26
innovations were identified in data covering the time
between January and June 2011. Separately, analysis of
4976 responses to open-ended questions in our survey
of 486 clinical teams identified 183 innovations over a
6-month period. This also suggested relatively low
rates of innovation among frontline teams, though
many of the solutions they did devise were ingenious
and resourceful. The largest number of frontline staff
innovations was focused on enhancing quality of
patient care; fewer aimed at improving administrative
effectiveness, and the smallest number concerned staff
wellbeing.
Many organisations were using specific quality
improvement methods to achieve change, including
Plan–Do–Study–Act cycles, Collaboratives, Lean, Six
Sigma, and Productive Ward (an NHS programme to
support ward teams in reviewing the processes and
environment used to provide patient care21). Some
organisations also used wider techniques to improve
quality, including organisation-level campaigns. Great
enthusiasm for these approaches was often reported
by those leading improvement efforts, but we also
sometimes observed a tendency towards uncritical or
indiscriminate use, and some evidence of ‘magical
thinking’ (‘this initiative will solve many problems
easily and quickly’). Frontline staff who had to imple-
ment these initiatives were often not consulted or
adequately informed about their purpose and imple-
mentation, and sometimes initiatives were abandoned
or forgotten after a short period of intense activity. In
some cases, there was insufficient acknowledgement
of the effort, expertise and investment required to
make such approaches work, and substantial problems
with quality of data collection and interpretation.
Culture and behaviour
Leadership was important for setting mission, direc-
tion and tone. Our observations, interviews and
surveys all emphasised the importance of high-quality
management in ensuring positive, innovative and
caring cultures at the sharp end of care. Some senior
teams encouraged and enabled frontline teams to
address challenges and to innovate, but recognised
that, along with demanding personal accountability
from staff, they also needed to fix systems problems
that prevented staff from functioning well. A strong
focus by executive and board teams on their own role
in identifying and addressing systems problems was
powerful in supporting cultural change that delivered
benefits for patients, and our observations and inter-
views identified many examples of impressive gains
being made by the sharp and blunt ends working
together around unifying goals.
Nevertheless, an important consequence of the
failure to clarify goals, to gather appropriate intelli-
gence or to address systems deficits was the existence
of frequent misalignments between the ways the blunt
end and the sharp end of organisations conceived of
quality and safety problems and their solutions. For
sharp-end staff, threats to safety and quality were
identified as weaknesses in systems, failures of reliabil-
ity, suboptimal staffing, inadequate resources and poor
leadership. Lack of support, appreciation and respect,
and not being consulted and listened to were seen as
endemic problems by staff in some organisations. In
contrast, some senior managers—particularly those
engaged in comfort seeking—tended to see frontline
staff behaviour and culture as the cause of quality pro-
blems. In consequence, those at the blunt and those at
the sharp end often did not agree on the causes of
variation in quality and safety and, therefore, on how
they should be addressed.
We also found substantial variation in the quality of
management. Our analyses of NSS data showed that
hospital standardised mortality ratios were inversely
associated with positive and supportive organisational
climates. Higher levels of staff engagement and health
and wellbeing were associated with lower levels of
mortality, as were staff reporting support from line
managers, well structured appraisals (e.g. agreeing
objectives, ensuring the individual feels valued,
respected and supported), and opportunities to influ-
ence and contribute to improvements at work. NSS
data also showed that staff perceptions of the support-
iveness of their immediate managers, the extent of
staff positive feeling, staff satisfaction and staff com-
mitment were associated with other important out-
comes, including patient satisfaction. In places where
staff reported high work pressure, patients on the
national surveys also reported too few nurses, insuffi-
cient support, and problems with information, privacy
and respect. In trusts with poor staff health and well-
being, high injury rates, and a high level of staff
Original research
112 Dixon-Woods M, et al. BMJ Qual Saf 2014;23:106–115. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2013-001947
intention to quit their jobs, patients reported that they
were generally less satisfied, and Care Quality
Commission ratings described poorer care and poorer
use of resources. These findings were consistent across
trust types (primary care, ambulance, mental health,
community and acute).
Also concerning was evidence that though team-
working seemed well established and widespread on
the surface, there was a surprising lack of clarity about
team purpose, objectives, membership, leadership and
performance among many teams. Our survey of 621
clinical teams demonstrated that team inputs and team
processes were significantly associated with the effect-
ive provision of good-quality care, but senior man-
agers were sometimes unable to identify teams and
team leaders. When team leaders were identified, they
were often confused about who their team members
were. Team members themselves had low agreement
about who was part of their team. Factors associated
with successful teams were the effort and skills of
team members, resources made available and good
processes. Clarity and agreement about team objec-
tives were key to clinical team effectiveness, along
with a participative approach to decision-making that
engaged all team members. Teams who regularly took
time out to reflect on their objectives, how they were
going about achieving these and how their perform-
ance needed to change were particularly likely to be
more effective and innovative.
DISCUSSION
This large mixed-method study identified many
‘bright spots’ of excellent caring and practice and
high-quality innovation across the NHS, but also con-
siderable inconsistency. Though Mid Staffordshire
may have been one particularly ‘dark spot’ in the
NHS, organisations throughout the NHS are likely to
have at least some shadows: there was little confidence
that care could be relied upon to be good at all times
in all parts of organisations, and we found evidence
of structural and cultural threats to quality and safety.
Our analysis points to how things may improve. First,
clear and explicit goals that are coherent from ward to
Whitehall are essential. Second, organisations need
intelligence: they need to know how well they are
really doing as an organisation, and where they need
to improve. This means actively seeking uncomfort-
able and challenging information from patients and
staff, rather than relying solely on formal data collec-
tion against narrow performance indicators that may
not give a fully rounded picture of quality of care.
Third, organisations must constantly review,
strengthen and improve their systems. System
improvement and strengthening may be needed at
many different levels, from smoothing clinical path-
ways to improving communication, teamwork, assur-
ing that clinical areas are adequately staffed with the
right kinds of skills, and ensuring personal
development, equipment standardisation, and train-
ing. Organisations also need to focus on developing
cultures that are person centred—not just task focused
—by valuing and building on the excellent care and
commitment delivered by many staff throughout the
NHS. This involves modelling and reinforcing values
and behaviours that underpin high-quality care,
patient safety and positive patient experience from the
blunt end to the sharp end of the whole system.
Our work involving a very large number of organi-
sations confirms that achieving quality and safety in
NHS organisations requires a robust strategy and uni-
fying vision. National leadership sets the tone, signals
importance, legitimises, and creates accountability
mechanisms. Yet the Francis public inquiry showed
that a major problem for Mid Staffordshire was the
large number of different agencies and bodies with a
say in the NHS. This contributed to fragmentation,
multiple competing pressures, ambiguity and diffusion
of responsibility. Our work similarly demonstrates that
proliferation of external agencies and expectations
creates conflicts, distraction and confusion from the
blunt to the sharp end of organisations about where
resources and attention should be directed. Where
incentives and external expectations conflict, compete
or fail to cohere, the ability of organisations to set
themselves clear, internally valued goals for achieving
their aspirations is weakened.22
In a distributed and complex system such as the
NHS, failures are least likely when the goals are clear
and uniting, and when appropriate, sensitively
designed regimes of control and support are found at
every level: from policymaking, through the layers of
formal regulatory systems, the institutional environ-
ment, individual organisations, teams and practi-
tioners, through to patients’ experiences.23 Coherence
of national direction is therefore essential to avoid dis-
persing responsibility and accountability, and creating
confusing messages and signals.24 As new bodies
move forward, including NHS England and the
Clinical Commissioning Groups, it is important that
they avoid creating further competing priorities, and
instead ensure focus and coherence.
National leadership needs to be matched by high-
quality leadership across multiple organisational levels
underpinned by clear, patient-focused goals and objec-
tives. The role of organisational boards in securing the
quality and safety of health services has become an
increasing focus of academic and policy interest,25 26
not least because of evidence of the link between lead-
ership from the top and the priority and resources
given to quality25 and clinician engagement.27 But we
found worrying evidence of NHS trust boards failing
to set clear goals for themselves as boards and for their
organisations. Goals do need to be set, and they should
be limited in number (to identify priorities while avoid-
ing the creation of priority thickets) and known not
only by all board members but (if appropriate) more
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widely within their trusts. Goals should be shaped by
the need to promote quality and safety, to ensure
sound financial performance, and to value dignity and
respect for patients. They should provide a framework
for objectives at all levels of trusts, from senior man-
agement to clinical teams at the sharp end. They
should be framed to encourage innovation at all levels,
and quality and safety of patient care must be overrid-
ing. Not all innovations need to be grand and over-
arching: fixing (apparently) small problems may result
in major gains.28
The Francis public inquiry showed that discounting
of warning signs of deterioration was a key feature of
board and executive behaviour at Mid Staffordshire.
Those in senior positions appear to have developed
‘blindsight’—a way of not seeing what was going
wrong. Our work confirms the importance of high-
quality intelligence (not just data) and making that
intelligence actionable. But we found sobering evi-
dence that NHS organisations are not always smart
with intelligence, and need to gear more towards
problem-sensing rather than comfort-seeking. At the
national level, care needs to be taken to ensure that
the number of measures organisations are expected to
report externally is well managed,29 and that measures
are aligned with local priorities, avoid imposing exces-
sive burdens, generate accurate intelligence,30 and
most of all, are useful for informing improvement
locally. Thus the right intelligence needs to be gath-
ered, interpreted correctly and fed back clearly to staff
at the sharp end of care, so that they consolidate and
improve their performance.31
Organisations need to be especially alert to the pos-
sibility of blind spots where they are unaware of pro-
blems. They should use multiple strategies to generate
intelligence and undertake self-assessment32 of local
culture and behaviours—not just rely on mandated
measures—and use a range of techniques for hearing
the patient’s voice and the voice and insights of those
at the sharp end of care. Consistent with Francis’ find-
ings, good management is as important as good lead-
ership in our analysis: the wellbeing of staff is closely
linked to the wellbeing of patients, and staff engage-
ment is a key predictor of a wide range of outcomes
in NHS trusts. Achieving high levels of engagement is
only possible in cultures that are generally positive,
when staff feel valued, respected and supported, and
when relationships are good between managers, staff,
teams and departments and across institutional bound-
aries. Staff experience frustration and conflict when
asked to work in systems that do not effectively serve
them, or the patients they care for; these system
defects include staff shortages or inappropriate skill
mix to address the needs of specific clinical areas. Our
analysis suggests that improving culture, behaviour
and systems requires system improvement and better
communication between the blunt end and sharp end.
This needs to be sustained, intense, mutually
respectful and focused on achieving a shared under-
standing of quality problems and joint working to put
them right. Trusts can develop these cultures by using
specific strategies (box 1), while recognising the com-
plexities of trying purposefully to engineer culture.12
This article has some limitations. In the available
space, we have not been able to provide full details of
methods or data from this unusually large research pro-
gramme. Instead we have sought to provide an over-
view of the key findings of the component studies. Our
synthesis of findings was interpretive and narrative,
and did not use a formal protocol. Others might reach
somewhat dissimilar conclusions or interpretations of
our data.33 However, we believe that our careful scru-
tiny of the data, extensive discussions, and detailed
analysis of themes have enabled us to produce a power-
ful, robust and rich picture. Future work should assess
the generalisability of these findings in other contexts,
including the other countries of the UK.
CONCLUSIONS
This very large-scale research programme suggests that
there is room for improvement in the quality and
safety of care offered by the NHS, and that this
improvement can build on the progress already made.
Trusts need continually to refresh, reinforce and
model an inspiring vision that keeps the patient at the
centre. It is essential to commit to an ethic of learning
and honesty,34 to work continually to improve organ-
isational systems, and to nurture the core values of
compassion, patient dignity and patient safety through
high-quality leadership. This implies equal attention
to systems, cultures and behaviours: setting coherent
and challenging goals and monitoring progress
towards them; empowering staff to provide high-
quality care and providing them with the means to
achieve this through routine practice and innovation;
and exemplifying and encouraging sound behaviours.
Box 1 Strategies for creating positive cultures
Senior leaders should:
Continually reinforce an inspiring vision of the work of
their organisations
Promote staff health and wellbeing
Listen to staff and encourage them to be involved in
decision making, problem solving and innovation at all
levels
Provide staff with helpful feedback on how they are
doing and celebrate good performance
Take effective, supportive action to address system pro-
blems and other challenges when improvement is
needed
Develop and model excellent teamwork
Make sure that staff feel safe, supported, respected
and valued at work.35
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